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Abstract 
Reaching an agreed definition of terrorism has proved problematic, with over 100 different 
working definitions counted. 1  Consensus stumbles particularly on issues of legitimacy, 
assessing reasons behind the violence and whether a state can commit acts of terrorism - or 
whether they are to be excluded as they have the monopoly on legitimate violence. Greater 
empirical research and independence in terrorism scholarship is required to formulate an 
agreed definition.  
 States should not be exempt from terrorism as part of a broader movement excluding 
any consideration of the motives or causes cited as the reason for the attack. The definition 
should focus on the nature of the act, not the philosophy behind it. For even if the cause or 
grievance is understandable, and can be reasonably argued with a defence of necessity, that 
does not mean the violence undertaken should cease to be illegal and inhumane. The ends 
must be separated from the means.  
 Clarity of definition is crucial for counter-terrorism efforts and the protection of civil 
liberties. Over-zealous recourse to draconian legislation peddled to prevent terrorism has 
qualified the rights of citizens, not only reducing their ability to hold their government to 
account, but also imposing laws that have the potential to work as a tool for terrorist 
recruitment rather than counter-terrorism.2 
 
Keywords: Terrorism; definitional debates; what is terrorism; state terror; critical terrorism 
studies; academic independence.  
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1 Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur & Sivan Hersch-Hoefler, ‘The Challenges of Conceptualising Terrorism’ 
[2010] Terrorism and Political Violence 16, 780. 
2 Taking Liberties (Chris Atkins, 2007). 
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Introduction 
Terrorism is amongst the most elusive terms for which political scholarship has sought to find 
a decisive definition. A comprehensive survey of terrorism academics counted 109 different 
working definitions3 and after decades of study we appear no closer to a consensus. From the 
United Nations, to national governments, to academics and scholars, terrorism is attributed 
a myriad of different meanings. This is problematic for the analytical clarity required for 
advancement in the field and counter-terrorism efforts. Particularly as terrorism has become 
a catch-all defence for extraordinary responses to violence, including grave violations of 
human rights.4 Although it has been reported that a new book is published on terrorism every 
six hours,5 the value of this work is sometimes debatable. In 2007, Furedi stated that scholarly 
inability to agree a fixed definition was representative of the sloppy thinking engaged in by 
some self-proclaimed terrorism scholars.6 
 The paper is split into two substantive sections. Firstly, it shall examine the reasons 
behind the disagreement. One reason is that definitions tend to get caught up in the reasons 
behind the act, seeking to examine whether the use of violence was legitimate or justifiable 
rather than looking at terrorism instrumentally. This is linked to the moral judgement and 
emotion attached to the word terrorist; many are unwilling to label those with sympathetic 
aims, terrorist. This cuts to the core of debate over what a terrorist is and links to the second 
central disagreement in terrorism scholarship: whether the State itself can be terrorist. The 
‘invisible college’7 of conservative scholars tend to perpetuate the orthodox view that it is 
inappropriate or unnecessary to dub a state terrorist. Some renowned terrorism scholars 
have strong links with state, or state-funded, organisations in the USA.8 Their research aims 
                                                 
3 Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur & Sivan Hersch-Hoefler, ‘The Challenges of Conceptualising Terrorism’ 
[2010] Terrorism and Political Violence 16, 780. 
4 Epitomised by Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay. 
5 Magnus Ranstorp, ‘Research Challenges Involved in Field Study on Terrorism in the Middle East’ in Adam 
Dolnik (ed), Conducting Terrorism Field Research: A Guide (Routledge 2013) 202. 
6 Frank Furedi, An Invitation to Terror - The Expanding Empire of the Unknown (Continuum Books 2007) xx. 
7 David Miller & Tom Mills, ‘The Terror Experts and the Mainstream Media: the Expert Nexus and its 
Dominance in the News Media’ [2009] Critical Studies on Terrorism 2, 425. 
8 David Miller & Tom Mills, ‘The Terror Experts and the Mainstream Media: the Expert Nexus and its 
Dominance in the News Media’ [2009] Critical Studies on Terrorism 2, 423. 
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and focus are arguably affected by this close contact and may contribute to explaining why 
they choose to focus on non-state terrorist campaigns carried out against Western interests. 
 The second part of this paper will examine the prospects for reaching a universally 
agreed definition. In order to edge closer to such a definition, scholars should cease examining 
the reasons or parties behind the act, and focus solely on the act itself. Without an objective 
approach, there can be no consensus. The prospects of reaching an agreed definition are 
improving; as terrorism studies has become a fashionable subject, the amount of work 
conducted in the field has vastly increased. However, competition and quality must be 
improved, moving beyond the views of conservative scholars and the self-perpetuating cycle 
of research as studies reference each other, often with scant empirical evidence to back up 
the initial claim.9 An increase in field and empirical research will improve scholarly attempts 
to define what behaviour should be labelled as terrorist.  
 
Part 1: Towards An Objective Definition 
A comprehensive survey of the field counted 109 working definitions of terrorism.10 This is 
problematic as the same act may be considered terrorist in some circumstances, but not 
others. 11  Whether something is defined as terrorism is often ‘based upon the assumed 
motivations of the perpetrators or the social standing of their victims’.12 It has also been 
found that proximity to home and country of origin both play a role in determining whether 
an individual will declare an act to be terrorism.  
 In the Rand chronology, a database of worldwide incidents of terror from 1986 to 
present,13 terrorism is solely defined by the nature of the act, ‘not by the identity of the 
perpetrators or the nature of their cause’.14 Yet the database does not include acts carried 
                                                 
9 Max Abrahams, ‘Why Terrorism Does Not Work’ [2006] International Security 31. 
10 Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur & Sivan Hersch-Hoefler, ‘The Challenges of Conceptualising  Terrorism’ 
[2010] Terrorism and Political Violence 16, 780. 
11 Brian Jenkins, The Study of Terrorism, Definitional Problems (RAND 1980) 2. 
12 Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur & Sivan Hersch-Hoefler, ‘The Challenges of Conceptualising  Terrorism’ 
[2010] Terrorism and Political Violence 16, 779. 
13 RAND, ‘RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents’ <http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-
incidents.html> accessed 1 November 2015. 
14 Jenkins (n11) 3. 
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out by the State.15 The US government defines terrorism as 'the unlawful use of force and 
violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian 
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives’; it fails to 
mention the threat of force, or religious or other ideological concerns. 16  The British 
government defines terrorism as 'the use or threat of action where… the use or threat is 
designed to influence the government or an international organisation or to intimidate the 
public or a section of the public, and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing 
a political, religious, racial or ideological cause’. 17  In itself this appears to be a helpful 
definition, yet unfortunately the provisions of the statute it stemmed from have been used 
to quash the civil liberties of British citizens.18 The National Advisory Committee definition 
focuses more on the reasons behind the act, defining it as ‘the threat of violence and the use 
of fear to coerce, persuade, and gain public attention’.19 The Central Intelligence Agency 
obfuscate the issue further by distinguishing between transnational and international 
terrorism.20 The term is applied ‘promiscuously’, often to describe acts which are ‘not strictly 
terrorism by definition’. 21  Working definitions are so variable because the ‘borderline 
separating political motives from highly personal motives and purely criminal motives is not 
always clear’.22 
 The UN stated that ‘The search for an agreed definition usually stumbles on two 
issues. The first is the argument that any definition should include States’ use of armed forces 
against civilians… The second objection is that peoples under foreign occupation have a right 
to resistance and a definition of terrorism should not override this right’.23 The fact there is 
                                                 
15 Brian M. Jenkins and Janera Johnson, ‘International Terrorism: A Chronology, 1968-1974’ [1975] RAND 
Report for Department of State and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 2. 
16 US Department of Justice - Federal Bureau of Investigation, ‘Terrorism 2002-2005’ 
<http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005> accessed 2 November 2015. 
17 Terrorism Act 2000, s1(1). 
18 Taking Liberties (Chris Atkins, 2007). 
19 Paul Rogers, ‘Global Terrorism’ in Cox M and Stokes D (ed), US Foreign Policy (OUP 2008). 
20 Jenkins (n11) 4. 
21 Jenkins (n11) 1. 
22 Jenkins (n11) 5. 
23 United Nations, UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. 
<http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/highlevelpanel.shtml> accessed 2 November 2015. 
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‘no consensus as to when there is a legitimate use of force'24 is problematic. Lacquer, a key 
terror analyst, stated that ‘[p]erhaps the only characteristic generally agreed upon is that 
terrorism always involved violence or threats of violence’.25  
 
The Separation of Ends and Means 
The plurality in definitions of terrorism is due in part to the emphasis placed on evaluating 
the motivations behind terrorism. When researching terrorism in Pakistan, an interviewee 
said to Bokhari: ‘we have a challenge in convincing you our struggle is justified’.26 This is 
indicative of the strength of negative connotations attached to the term. Even those who 
carry out acts that are of a cruel and violent nature, targeting civilians directly, tend not to 
own a terrorist status, preferring to claim political legitimacy.27 The Northern Ireland troubles 
of the last century were punctuated by prisoners engaging in hunger strikes for the right to 
be referred to as political prisoners rather than terrorists.28 Justifiability and legitimacy seem 
ingrained in our considerations - we are reluctant to brand someone we have sympathy with 
a terrorist. This is because a terrorist is seen as an evil, morally redundant individual. The 
British Prime Minister at the time of the South African apartheid did not look upon the ANC 
as an organisation fighting for freedom; instead Thatcher denounced Nelson Mandela and 
the organisation as terrorist.29 Mandela is often invoked in this debate, mainly because he 
offers a particularly sympathetic image - ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s Nelson 
Mandela’.30 Society has decided his acts were not only excusable, they were in fact justifiable, 
bestowing him with a Nobel peace prize.  
 There is a moral judgement involved in the decision to ascribe the terrorist label to 
someone. It is a value-laden term that often evokes an emotional response. Thinkers can be 
                                                 
24 Louise I. Shelley, Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, Crime and Terrorism (Cambridge 2014) 11. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Laila Bokhari, ‘Face to face with my case study’ in Adam Dolnik (ed), Conducting Terrorism Field Research: A 
Guide (Routledge 2013) 91. 
27 Furedi (n6). 
28 BBC History, Northern Ireland: The Troubles (BBC History 2007) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/recent/troubles/the_troubles_article_07.shtml> accessed 20 September 2015. 
29 Andrew Bevins and Michael Streeter, ‘Nelson Mandela: From ‘Terrorist’ to Tea with the Queen’ The 
Independent (London, 9 July 1996). 
30 Doug Stokes, ‘Ideas and Avocados: Ontologising Critical Terrorism Studies’ [2009] International Relations 23, 
90. 
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unknowingly involving emotional factors in their considerations due to the strength of the 
negative connotations attached to the term. Booth and Dunne stated that ‘the label ‘terrorist’ 
today serves a propaganda function; it is virtually unusable as a dispassionate analytical 
concept’.31 Branding someone terrorist today, more than ever after 9/11 and the resulting 
media maelstrom, is tantamount to declaring someone evil, morally indefensible and beyond 
redemption. As George Bush stated - there is ‘no such thing as a good terrorist. No national 
aspiration, no remembered wrong can ever justify the deliberate murder of the innocent. Any 
government that rejects this principle, trying to pick and choose its terrorist friends, will know 
the consequences’.32 The irony of this statement being made by the President of the United 
States, particularly Bush, is inescapable, but it is still illustrative. 
 There is ‘moral condemnation’33 inherent in the term, it is ‘what the bad guys do’.34 
As Baulliard stated in his Hypothesis on Terror - ‘since we are the Good, it can only be Evil that 
has struck us’.35 Emotions can be unpredictable and may be having an effect even when we 
believe we are responding rationally. ‘The terms terrorism and terrorist are highly politicised, 
and this makes dispassionate analysis of the associated practices difficult to achieve’.36 
Politics is not devoid of emotion and we can never be led completely by rationality.37 This is 
of particular concern in terrorism studies, where the emotional factor can be heightened. 
Violence aimed at citizens, the turning of our homes into war zones is emotionally 
provocative. Objectivity has become nigh on impossible in the face of the fetishised icon of 
terrorism.38 Academic scholarship is not beyond such concerns. When advising best practice 
in terrorism field research, Ranstorp stated that one must be careful to stay neutral and not 
become emotionally involved with the cause.39 
                                                 
31 Ken Booth & Tim Dunne, Terror In Our Time (Routledge 2012) 24. 
32 Michael Mandel, How America Gets Away with Murder, Illegal Wars, Collateral Damage and Crimes Against 
Humanity (Pluto Press 2004) 40. 
33 Jean Baulliard, The Spirit of Terrorism and Other Essays (Verso 2003). 
34 Jenkins (n11) 1. 
35 Baulliard (n33). 
36 Booth & Dunne (n31) 19. 
37 Ian Burkitt, ‘Powerful emotions: Power, Government and Opposition in the War on Terror’ [2005] Sociology: 
Journal of the British Sociological Association 39. 
38 James Der Derian, ‘Imaging Terror: Logos, Pathos and Ethos’ [2005] Third World Quarterly 26, 26. 
39 Magnus Ranstorp, ‘Research Challenges Involved in Field Study on Terrorism in the Middle East’ in Adam 
Dolnik (ed), Conducting Terrorism Field Research: A Guide (Routledge 2013). 
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 The public, states and scholars alike are influenced by considerations of the legitimacy 
and justifiability behind the violence; this arguably hinders neutral decision-making. To state 
that an act of extreme violence would be terrorist only if the cause behind it was illegitimate, 
only leads one to greater considerations of what makes something legitimate - a road down 
which there can be no clear or objective answers. This line of thought led eminent terror 
scholar Jenkins to state - ‘terrorism is in the eye of the beholder’ and that ‘[t]he term terrorism 
is slippery and also politically loaded’40 - illustrating the subjectivity that is proving to be an 
obstacle to reaching an agreed definition. It is dangerous to begin dissecting violence in this 
way, leaving ambiguity about potential justifiability or legitimacy. In this debate I refer to 
Walzer - and his writings on torture because I think they prove helpful.41 He acknowledged 
that perhaps there is a potential for extraordinary circumstances, where a state may have 
virtual certainty of a perpetrators’ guilt and knowledge in a ‘ticking time bomb’ situation and 
feel bound to employ extreme interrogation techniques to extract information in order to 
save lives. However, should these extremely unlikely circumstances arise, the argument of 
necessity does not alter the status of the act of torture - it remains wrong - it is always 
immoral, inhumane and illegal. Should a Prime Minister or President42 be so compelled to 
order such an action he should do so in the full knowledge of the inhumanity and illegality of 
such an act, and be prepared to face the consequences. That even if he believes this is the 
action he must take, he also believes that it ‘is wrong, indeed abominable, not just sometimes, 
but always’.43 A belief in the necessity of an action does necessarily not make it just or legal. 
I defer to this reasoning when analysing terrorism. Even if a cause is found to be legitimate, 
even where despairing circumstances occasion violence that can be understood, it does not 
detract from the fundamental truth that the very essence of terrorism is wrong. The act can 
never be condoned. The ends do not justify the means. Targeting non-combatants with 
violence, whether civilians or military off the battlefield, is always terrorism. 
                                                 
40 Jenkins (n11) 9. 
41Michael Walzer, ‘Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands’ in Sanford Levinson (ed), Torture: A Collection 
(OUP 2004)  65. 
42 Or indeed any individual, although it is preferable for decisions and edicts such as this come directly from 
high-level leaders who can be justly held to account. 
43 Michael Walzer, ‘Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands’ in Sanford Levinson (ed), Torture: A Collection 
(OUP 2004) 65 
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A Terrorist State? 
The subjectivity involved in defining terrorism is most clearly seen in debate around the idea 
of the state as a terrorist; some scholars argue that ‘political violence by states should not be 
classified as terrorism’.44 The US state department definition ‘limits the capacity to employ 
terror to ‘subnational’ groups only’.45 In Terror In Our Time, Booth and Dunne address the 
reasons given for this; that it is unnecessary due to the fact that states can be charged with 
war crimes, that analytical clarity demands the removal of states from the realm of terrorism 
and the Weberian idea that states have the monopoly on the legitimacy of violence. 46 
However, they take a strong position from the outset, stating unequivocally that it is ‘illogical 
and unjustifiable to exclude states and their agents from the language of terror, terrorism and 
terrorist’.47 Boaz Ganor states that terrorism does not, in fact, rest on a subjective outlook - 
that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter - but that an objective definition 
can and must be reached, as it is ‘indispensable to any serious attempt to combat terrorism’.48 
To Ganor, the crucial decider of whether an act is terrorist is who the target of the violence is 
– a group targeting civilians will always be considered terrorist, no matter how worthy their 
goal may be perceived to be, or who is carrying out the act. The ends never justify the means. 
To say otherwise degrades the status of human life to that of a pawn. A clear definition 
requires the invocation of staunch objectivity, where it is based on the act alone, not the 
actors or their reasons. It should revolve around the key markers of terrorism: the targeting 
of civilians; the aim of affecting the wider public beyond those directly affected by the attacks; 
instilling fear to achieve their wider aims. Whether the group’s grievances or desires are 
sympathetic, therefore making their act legitimate or justifiable should not come into 
considerations over whether an act should be considered that of terror. After all, even when 
we may ‘be persuaded that a terrorist group is motivated by a legitimate sense of injustice’ it 
does not mean that we ‘condone their use of terrorist means’.49 The ends do not erase the 
                                                 
44 Ruth Blakeley, State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South (Routledge 2009) 25. 
45 Booth & Dunne (n31) 38. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid 7. 
48 Boaz Ganor, ‘Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?’ [2010] Police 
Practice and Research: An International Journal 3. 
49 Paul Wilkinson, International Terrorism (OUP 1992), 234. 
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wrong of the means when the means involves intentionally targeting civilians in order to 
spread fear, applying pressure for political or other aims. No matter who the actor is or why 
the act was committed, a terrorist act remains a terrorist act.  
 
To exclude states from the remit of terrorism is foolhardy and reeks of political expediency. 
A UN report stated that ‘[M]ost people and states… appear to consider ‘state terrorism’ to 
be ‘the most harmful and deadly form of terrorism’.50 In a 2007 article, Tunadar stated that 
‘historically speaking, terrorism has also been used as a psychological tool for creating fear 
within the state, to discredit enemies and political opponents, and to cause people to turn 
not against the state but rather to the state for protection and security’. 51  She draws 
attention to recent research by Ganser, which found that the majority of terrorism that 
occurred during the Cold War was carried out by states.52 However, the inclusion of the state 
in, or rather lack of exclusion from, definitions of terror continues to be a core area of 
contention for academics. This may be demonstrative of the fact that a number of terrorism 
experts are not impartial, but are influenced by state organisations. After all, much of the 
body of knowledge we have about terrorism was ‘created to reflect the priorities and values 
of certain social interests’,53 and was largely created by the Global North, for the Global 
North. This issue is explored in the next section.  
 
Academic independence? 
The difficulties associated with an agreed definition may be linked to questions around 
knowledge production. A potential lack, or perceived lack, of academic independence 
regarding terrorism research may be contributing to the problem of reaching a universally 
agreed definition. In particular, issues arise in relation to funding of research. In a 2009 study, 
Miller and Mills found that ‘only 30 of the most prominent 100 [terrorism experts] were 
                                                 
50 Michael Mandel, How America Gets Away with Murder, Illegal Wars, Collateral Damage and Crimes Against 
Humanity (Pluto Press 2004) 45. 
51 Ola Tunader, ‘The War on Terror and the Pax Americana’ in David Ray Griffin and Peter Dale Scott (ed), 9/11 
and American Empire: Intellectuals Speak Out (Arris Books 2007) 151. 
52 Ibid 151. 
53 Miller & Mills (n7) 415. 
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‘independent’ of state or private think-tanks or direct corporate funding’. 54  They drew 
attention to the studies that have found ‘that the likelihood of independent advice and 
expertise declines when ‘experts’ work directly for or even are funded by private interests’.55 
Academics who make their career within or with close links to state or state funded 
organisations - such as rightwing think-tanks, the military and organisations affiliated to the 
intelligence services which includes some universities - have a tendency to focus on 
government interests.56 Questions arise around studies that focus exclusively on terrorism 
aimed at Western states; such studies may perpetuate the United States’ narrative on the 
war on terror, namely that military action in certain Middle Eastern countries is necessary and 
justified as their governments engage in terrorism, support or harbour terrorists, 57  and 
therefore cannot be reasoned with (although there is a political expediency involved in 
determining which states will be dubbed sponsors  of terrorism and which groups terrorist).58 
This viewpoint is reflected in the work of early experts who focused on violence aimed at 
Western governments by non-state actors.59 A plurality of narratives would include thinkers 
that view certain past actions of the USA as terrorist. Chomsky and Herman labeled the focus 
of ‘big powers and their clients’ ‘retail terrorism’, stating that it is in sharp contrast to the 
‘wholesale terrorism’ carried out by the states themselves. 60  However, the networks of 
conservative terrorism academics continue to follow the focus of these big powers, 
disregarding the importance of larger scale state terrorism. 61  In the book he edited on 
conducting terrorism field research, Dolnik also commented upon the body of research that 
was dependent on incorrect data. He drew attention to politically manipulated data, research 
based on governments’ perspectives on terror, and he recommended caution in relying upon 
government data.62 Miller and Mills stated that their ‘findings on the connections and on the 
                                                 
54 Ibid 419. 
55 Ibid 419. 
56 Ibid 416-418. 
57 James M Lutz and Brenda J Lutz, Global Terrorism (3rd edn, Routledge, 2013), 8. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid 417. 
60 Mandel (n24) 45. 
61 Ruth Blakeley, State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South (Routledge 2009). 
62 Adam Dolnik, ‘The Need for Field Research on Terrorism’ in Adam Dolnik (ed), Conducting Terrorism Field 
Research: A Guide (Routledge 2013) 4. 
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quality of some of the work of these experts is a cautionary tale for those seeking to rely on 
the information and knowledge supplied’.63  
 There is an element of state influence in many definitions, if only because the majority 
of leading academics’ define terror in a way that precludes states from being dubbed 
terrorist.64 They argue that state acts are unsuitable to be branded terrorist, as there are 
alternative avenues to deal with state misconduct, such as war crimes or crimes against 
humanity. However, this has not stopped states of the Global North dubbing others to be 
terrorist states.65 States wish to keep hold of the definition for use when it suits them, but 
wish to prevent the term from being used against them. As a self-interested actor the State 
is primarily interested in the terrorism that affects it, and which is perpetuated by groups that 
seek to attack it. Therefore this is the focus that the USA encourages. This is particularly 
significant when one considers the fact that the majority of key experts in the field have 
worked within, or been funded by, USA state organisations and are likely to have been 
influenced by these policy objectives.66 As Chomsky stated in his article on Rogue States, ‘they 
are not simply a criminal state, but one that defies the orders of the powerful - who are, of 
course, exempt’.67 He illustrates this with the example of the United States and Cuba. Cuba 
has been denounced as rogue due to allegations of involvement in international terrorism, 
‘but the US does not fall into the category despite its terrorist attacks against Cuba for close 
to 40 years’.68 The United States wants its actions to be outside the definition of terrorism,69 
and has the political clout to make it so.  
 The central disagreements in the definition debate surround ideas of the legitimate 
use of violence; by an actor one is unwilling to brand terrorist, either because their cause 
arouses sympathy (and therefore affixing the term terrorist to it does not seem justified), or 
because they are a state actor and the term is inappropriate. The second section will evaluate 
the possibility of reaching a universally accepted definition and argue that in order to do so 
                                                 
63 Miller & Mills (n7) 424. 
64 Ruth Blakeley, State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South (Routledge 2009) 25. 
65 David Cameron, ‘U.K. Raises Terror Threat Level’ CNN (29 August 2014) 
http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1408/29/cnr.02.html accessed 3 November 2014. 
66 Miller & Mills (n7). 
67 Noam Chomsky, ‘Rogue States’ Z Magazine (April 1998). 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ganor (n48). 
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we must adhere rigidly to objectivity, moving beyond the subjectivity of the reasons and 
actors behind the violence. 
 
Part 2: Turning Away From Subjectivity 
So far this paper has focused upon key areas of contention in the definition debate. 
Definitions share commonalities and key ingredients, therefore if the identified contentious 
areas are resolved, an agreed definition may not be far behind. In order to do this it is crucial 
to stop mythologising the definition of terrorism as if an objective definition could not be 
reached. Definitions have become more objective, less politicised and increasingly clear. 
Although agreement is still frustrated by international politics, it is easy to see the progress 
that has been made since the highly personalised definitions of the seventies.  
 The definitions submitted to the 1973 UN Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism70 included 
‘any threat or act of violence committed by a person or group of persons on foreign territory 
or in any other place under international jurisdiction against any person with a view to 
achieving political objective’ (Haitian government),71 which is in itself a reasonable definition 
of war.72 ‘[H]einous acts of barbarism committed in the territory of a third state by a foreigner 
against a person possessing a nationality other than that of the offender for the purpose of 
exerting pressure in a conflict not strictly internal in nature’ (French government),73 which 
assumes nationality to be the reason for terrorism and reflects dated and colonial concerns. 
A group of nonaligned nations, including Algeria, India, Mauritania, Nigeria and Syria included 
in their proposed definition: ‘acts of violence and other repressive acts by colonial, racist and 
alien regimes against peoples struggling for liberation’ and the ‘tolerating and assisting by a 
state the organisations of […] fascist or mercenary groups whose terrorist activity is directed 
against other sovereign countries’. They also stated that the definition must not ‘affect the 
                                                 
70 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism’ (1973) UN 
Doc A/9028. 
71 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism’ (1973) UN 
Doc A/9028, 22. 
72 Brian M. Jenkins and Janera Johnson, ‘International Terrorism: A Chronology, 1968-1974’ [1975] RAND 
Report for Department of State and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 2. 
73 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism’ (1973) UN 
Doc A/9028, 21. 
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inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all peoples under colonial and 
racist regimes and other forms of alien domination’.74  
 These definitions all reflect different concerns to those of contemporary international 
relations and terrorism. There has been a great deal of development in the last forty years, 
with advancement beyond individual states’ political concerns. Although there is still 
contention, definitions are growing broader and increasing in neutrality as states move 
beyond the expression of individualistic concerns in their definitions. The UN stated that 
agreement is now only stumbling on two points,75 not by the myriad of issues seen in only a 
small subset of the 1970s definitions. This shift in definitional elements is indicative of 
increased knowledge and awareness of terrorism in the 21st century, as well as the increased 
internationality of the phenomena, and academia more generally. This development is in 
itself hopeful, demonstrative of potential for reaching an agreed definition in the future, and 
an international commitment to the cessation and prevention of terrorism. As global relations 
improve, so too do the prospects of reaching a consensus. 
 States and academics alike must continue to advance beyond subjective judgements 
about the actor and focus purely on the act. After all,’[i]t is a duty that befalls scholars to 
labour to provide definitional and analytical clarity’.76  Esteemed terrorist studies scholar 
Jenkins stated that we are mistaken to believe that there is no way to reach an objective 
definition. He believed that ‘one man’s terrorist is everyone’s terrorist’. 77  The inherent 
vagueness of the term, and the war on terror, is dangerous as it ‘legitimises an almost 
unlimited range of foreign and domestic policy interventions’.78 British terrorism legislation79 
has been used to quash the right to peaceful protest.80 Police have utilised the provisions 
aimed to prevent terrorism to stop, search and detain protestors.81 This muddies the waters 
                                                 
74 Ibid. 
75 United Nations, ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change’ (2004) <http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/highlevelpanel.shtml> accessed 2 November 
2015. 
76 Booth & Dunne (n31) 19. 
77 Jenkins (n11) 2. 
78 Andrew Heywood, Politics (3rd edn, Palgrave 2007) 137. 
79 Terrorism Act 2000; Terrorism Act 2006. 
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making the distinction between civil disobedience and terrorism increasingly indistinct. The 
war on terror has been used to justify warfare, drone-strikes and interference in many states 
domestic affairs. It has provided a means of justification to states, such as Russia, carrying out 
their own acts of violence. ‘Through backing the West in their war on terror, Putin hoped he 
could gain their support, or at least acquiescence, in what he saw as his own fight against 
terrorism in Chechnya’.82 Without objectivity ‘virtually every unpleasant phenomenon can be 
represented as a form of terrorism’83 and governments may use this to undermine legitimate 
political protest. Progress has been made, but further advancement beyond political 
considerations must still be made. It is therefore not only possible, it is imperative, that an 
objective definition be crafted. 
 
 
 
Agree to Disagree? Resolvable differences 
Definitional disagreements can be resolved by addressing the central problems discussed in 
this essay. Terrorism is not an ‘essentially contested concept’84 - resolution can be found. 
Prospects are improving as the amount of academics attracted to the field of terrorism studies 
is increasing, as is the body of work produced. The more scholarship moves beyond the nexus 
of the traditionalist conservative scholars, and the more states cooperate on the international 
stage, the better the prospects for agreement become. In a recent article Abrahams drew 
attention to a self-perpetuating circle of work as studies reference each other, often with 
scant empirical evidence to back up the initial claim.85 This supports the contention that 
rigorous research which challenges the accepted truths of the field is necessary for its 
advancement. There is an impassioned case for the importance of increased field research, 
seen in the work of Dolnik,86 as it has the potential to uncover new information. This brings 
hope for a new era of terrorism scholarship with academics actively engaging in empirical 
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research. Increased knowledge and clarity in the field improves the prospects of reaching an 
agreed definition of what terrorism is. This is of critical importance as a far greater amount of 
papers have been written upon theory than empirically based research.87  
 Increased competition and empirical research in the field should lead to a greater 
ability to focus objectively on the qualities of terrorism, moving beyond the subjectivity of 
value-judgements surrounding who can and cannot be a terrorist, and when terroristic 
violence may be justifiable. These are subjects that may be worth exploring in their own right, 
but can be removed from the remit of definition in order to reach the agreed consensus that 
is so crucial. After all - ‘[i]f this is an age of terror, then it has become all the more important 
for us to understand exactly what it is that terrorism means’.88 Deciding whether a State can 
commit acts of terrorism is key to this process. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Reaching an agreed definition of terrorism is essential to serious attempts to study and 
combat terrorism. Without such a definition, states’ are free to brand political dissent and 
resistance as terrorist, meeting such actions with an over inflated response, which infringes 
upon civil liberties and human rights, in addition to undermining the strength of the term 
when applied to violent actors. There is a moral righteousness inherent in dubbing someone 
terrorist, that is being exploited by government. As the strength of the term and the acts 
required to meet it are weakened, it gives violent actors the power to convincingly argue that 
they are being treated wrongly and that their actions are in essence a political protest against 
the way they have been treated. Government and terrorist prevention agencies’ positions are 
thereby weakened by the widening of the net, and their own harsh responses breed more 
discontent and retaliatory violence. It is not only possible, it is imperative, that a consensus 
be reached and a definition agreed. There should be no examination into what is a legitimate 
cause for violence, as this muddies the waters and is at its core subjective. The focus should 
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be on the means, not the ends. Terrorism is still distinguishable from other crimes by its 
indiscriminate attack against civilians for the purpose of striking fear in the wider population. 
 Despite the contentious points that must first be resolved, there is hope for an agreed 
definition as new scholars flock to the field of terrorism study, unfounded research is 
scrutinised and greater empirical research is encouraged. The myriad of definitions produced 
shows that academics take their duty to provide accurate definitions seriously.89 As do states 
and international institutions, which is why time has been dedicated to discussing resolution 
on the global stage. Academics are aware of the importance, acknowledging that without an 
agreed definition there is the very real danger of the term being used to suit one’s own goals. 
 There is an unpredictable risk inherent in allowing governments the freedom to 
declare something terrorist in line with their own interests, especially when ‘counter 
terrorism’ provides a catch-all defence to extraordinary government responses. With greater 
competition and independence in the field, in addition to an objective approach and a move 
towards primary source research there are good prospects for reaching a consensus on the 
definition of terror. After all: ‘just because a particular concept happens to be contested does 
not mean in itself that there must always be disagreement about it’.90 
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